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ABSTRACT 
 While there seems to be widespread agreement that the U.S. counterterrorism 
narrative is failing, there is little empirical evidence for what the U.S. counter-narrative 
strategy since 9/11 has been, nor is there an analytical framework for measuring its 
success or failure. This thesis investigates the effectiveness of the U.S. counterterrorism 
narrative strategy in the post-9/11 period (2001 through 2016), and develops an effective 
U.S. counterterrorism narrative strategy. Content analysis of 75 U.S. presidential 
speeches and 50 U.S. Department of State Twitter postings, and a measurement of U.S. 
performative power between 2001 and 2016, demonstrates that only the narrative speech 
factor of promoting commonality has a negative correlation with terrorist attacks in the 
United States. More messages that promote commonality correlates to decreased terrorist 
attacks. To understand when to use this messaging, the social identity analytical method 
was applied to a U.S. presidential speech and an Islamic State leader’s speech and 
demonstrates that the U.S. government lacks comprehension of social in-group 
identification nuances. To target messaging effectively, the framework should be applied 
on a consistent basis, promoting commonality in narratives within a larger comprehensive 
counterterrorism strategy. 
v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vi 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS .......................................................................4 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................4 
1. Terrorism ........................................................................................4 
2. Ideology and Narrative ..................................................................6 
3. Evaluating Counterterrorism Strategies .....................................9 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN .............................................................................10 
D. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................17 
II. CONTENT ANALYSIS OF U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM 
NARRATIVES .....................................................................................................19 
A. U.S. PRESIDENTIAL SPEECHES .......................................................19 
1. Countering Perceptions ...............................................................20 
2. Undermining Adversarial Leadership .......................................21 
3. Positive Vision ..............................................................................21 
4. Promoting Commonality .............................................................21 
B. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE TWITTER POSTINGS .................30 
C. U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM PERFORMATIVE POWER .............33 
D. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................36 
III. A FRAMEWORK TO EVALUATE U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM 
NARRATIVES .....................................................................................................37 
A. DEFINITION AND APPLICATION OF FRAMEWORK .................37 
1. Social Identity Analytical Method (Social Identity Theory 
and the Analytical Markers) .......................................................37 
2. Apply Social Identity Analytical Method to Islamic State 
Speech............................................................................................38 
3. Apply Social Identity Analytical Method to U.S. 
Presidential Speech ......................................................................42 
B. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................45 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS, IMPLEMENTATION, AND CONCLUSION ......47 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS .........................................................................47 
1. Promote Commonality .................................................................47 
2. Counterterrorism Policy Needs to be Comprehensive 
(Performative Power) ..................................................................48 
3. Conduct the Social Identity Analytical Method ........................49 
B. IMPLEMENTATION .............................................................................49 
viii 
1. Create an Interagency Office ......................................................49 
2. Integrate Social Identity Analytical Method Analysis ..............50 
3. Achieve Unified Action across Agencies ....................................50 
C. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................51 
APPENDIX A. LIST OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL SPEECHES SELECTED 
FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS (2013–2016) .......................................................53 
APPENDIX B. U.S. PRESIDENTIAL SPEECHES AND CONTENT 
ANALYSIS (2013–2016) ......................................................................................55 
APPENDIX C. LIST OF U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE TWEETS AND 
CONTENT ANALYSIS.......................................................................................61 
APPENDIX D. PERFORMATIVE POWER OF U.S. 
COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY ..................................................................69 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................71 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ...................................................................................79 
 
ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Terrorist Attacks in the United States, 2001–2016 ....................................13 
Figure 2. Percentages of Total Excerpts Associated with Each Category ................20 
Figure 3. Ratio of Presidential Speeches Delivered ..................................................23 
Figure 4. Ratio of Geographic Regions in Which the Sample Speeches Were 
Delivered ....................................................................................................24 
Figure 5. Speech Factors over Time ..........................................................................25 
Figure 6. Statistically Significant Speech Factors (Positive Vision and 
Promoting Commonality) between 2001 and 2016 ...................................27 
Figure 7. Percentages of Tweets Associated with Each Category ............................32 
Figure 8. Performative Power of U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy ............................34 
x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Summary of Policy Recommendations ......................................................51 
 
xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
CVE  countering violent extremism 
DHS  Department of Homeland Security  
DOS  Department of State 
FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation 
GTD  Global Terrorism Database 
ODNI  Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
PMF  Popular Mobilization Forces 
  
xiv 




While it seems to be widely agreed upon that the U.S. counterterrorism narrative 
is failing, little empirical evidence is available describing the U.S. counter-narrative 
strategy since 9/11 or an analytical framework for measuring its success or failure.1 This 
research is designed to contribute toward filling that gap by investigating the 
effectiveness of the U.S. counterterrorism narrative strategy between 2001 and 2016 and 
developing an effective U.S. government counterterrorism narrative strategy for the 
future. This thesis creates a framework for measuring the American government’s post-
9/11 counterterrorism narrative in the period 2001 and 2016 by using four methods: 
content analysis of U.S. presidential speeches, content analysis of U.S. Department of 
State (DOS) Twitter postings, an assessment of overall U.S. counterterrorism strategies, 
called performative power, and applying the social identity analytical method to two 
speeches delivered in November 2016.  
First, this thesis analyzes a sample of 75 speeches given by U.S. presidents 
overseas and directed at a foreign audience between 2001 and 2016. In addition, this 
thesis analyzes 50 randomly selected tweets produced by the DOS “ThinkAgain_DOS” 
Twitter account posted between 2014 and 2016. Words and phrases from each speech and 
tweet are coded into one of four categories: countering perceptions, undermining 
adversarial leadership, positive vision, or promoting commonality. Each category is then 
given a weighted index score based upon the number of times words or phrases from that 
category are found in each speech or tweet. These weighted index scores are then 
averaged out by year and plotted against the number of terrorist attacks in the United 
States during that same year.  
Next, the thesis analyzes the performative power of the U.S. counterterrorism 
policy between 2001 and 2016. The performative power of counterterrorism strategy 
                                                 
1 Joseph I. Lieberman, Ticking Time Bomb: Counter-Terrorism Lessons from the U.S. Government’s 
Failure to Prevent the Fort Hood Attack (Collingdale, PA: Diane Publishing, 2011), 25; William D. 
Casebeer and James A. Russell, “Storytelling and Terrorism: Towards a Comprehensive ‘Counter-
Narrative Strategy,’” Strategic Insights 4, no. 3 (March 2005): 4. 
xvi 
aims to measure the “social visibility” of counterterrorism measures to establish a 
correlation between the amount of “social drama generated” and terrorist attacks.2 Once 
the performative power of counterterrorism policy is determined per year, that data is 
plotted against terrorist attacks in the United States during the same year to find a 
correlation using a regression analysis statistical model.  
Lastly, this thesis applies the social identity analytical method to assess two 
speeches (one delivered by a U.S. president and one delivered by an Islamic State leader) 
qualitatively within an overall social context. The social identity theory framework 
demonstrates how and when groups change, how a group is impacted by changes in 
communication, and how a group’s socially constructed identity may allow a group to 
change from terrorist tactics to non-violent political activity.3 
Any recommendations for an improved U.S. strategy on counterterrorism 
narratives must be grounded in lessons learned from the U.S. narrative from 2001 
through 2016. After conducting a content analysis, this thesis determined that the only 
speech factor with a strong statistical correlation to terrorist attacks in the United States 
during the same year was promoting commonality. When U.S. presidential speeches 
included more messages that cultivate commonality with foreign audiences, terrorist 
attacks in the United States in that year decreased. Although not a causal measurement, 
this simple statistical model demonstrates a negative relationship between these two 
variables. Using the social identity analytical method framework illustrates that 
appropriated in-group identifications continue to make a difference between terrorist 
groups, governments, and religious identifications more broadly, and that the U.S. 
government has failed to understand these nuances or to react correctly to the broader 
terrorist landscape.  
To implement these recommendations, an interagency counterterrorism office 
would be best established under the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The 
                                                 
2 Beatrice de Graaf, Evaluating Counterterrorism Performance: A Comparative Study (New York: 
Routledge, 2011), 124. 
3 David Brannan, Kristen Darken, and Anders Strindberg, Practitioner’s Way Forward: Terrorism 
Analysis (Salinas, CA: Agile Press, 2014), 63. 
xvii 
DHS is responsible for a variety of programs and activities abroad and domestically to 
counter terrorist groups and their activities. To develop a comprehensive counterterrorism 
narrative strategy, a collaborative, interagency counterterrorism office is best placed 
within the DHS. Analysts in this office would be responsible for integrating ongoing 
social identity analytical method analysis in all areas of social groups and movements 
worldwide and domestically, as well as keeping track of opportune moments for targeting 
narratives. This counterterrorism office would also maintain metrics on the entire U.S. 
government performative power on a regular basis. While this thesis only studied 
presidential speeches, other political leaders make legislation and deliver speeches that 
explain counterterrorism policies. The interagency counterterrorism office must 
incorporate the development of counterterrorism narrative strategy for all those who 
speak on behalf of the U.S. government. 
U.S. counterterrorism narrative strategy from the post-9/11 period from 2001 to 
2016 has proved largely ineffective. Content analysis of 75 U.S. presidential speeches, 50 
DOS Twitter postings, and the measurement of U.S. performative power demonstrated 
that only the narrative factor of promoting commonality has a negative correlation with 
terrorist attacks. More messages promoting commonality correlates to decreased terrorist 
attacks. To fully understand when to use this messaging more often, the social identity 
analytical method demonstrated that the U.S. government has lacked comprehension of 
social in-group identification nuances or how to react appropriately to the larger terrorist 
social context. To target messaging effectively, the framework should be applied on a 
consistent basis, to target narrative messages that promote commonality within a larger 
comprehensive counterterrorism strategy.  
xviii 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Just as terrorism takes a narrative form, so, too, does counterterrorism strategy, 
which frames the context for fighting terrorist ideology. Professor Beatrice de Graaf, 
chair of the Utrecht University History of International Relations Section, defines 
counterterrorism as “a way of communicating to the audience what society should look 
like, what constitutes a collective threat, what actions are considered legal, and what is 
defined alien and hostile.”1 In other words, governments create a social contract around 
counterterrorism by identifying what is threatened, the source of the threat, and how far 
the authorities can or should attempt to counter it. Because counterterrorism adopts a 
narrative, terrorists receive, interpret, and alter such messages to promote their own 
narratives. Terrorist groups and governments alike attempt to influence audiences to 
combat the others’ narrative and achieve their own goals.2  
Governments often frame the problem of terrorism in multiple ways: a criminal 
problem, a social issue, an emergency management concern, a threat to national security 
or to democracy itself, or warfare.3 The ultimate objective of fighting terrorism is less 
clear. Governments should question whether the goal of counterterrorism is to erase our 
fear of terrorism or to win their hearts and minds.4 If the American public believes that 
the Islamic State has maintained its power and prestige, despite the U.S. military killing 
or detention of many of its terrorists and restriction of its territory in Syria and Iraq, it is 
difficult to argue that U.S. counterterrorism has been successful.5 Freese postulates that a 
government’s decisions on counterterrorism are largely influenced by public opinion.6 
                                                 
1 Beatrice de Graaf, Evaluating Counterterrorism Performance: A Comparative Study (New York: 
Routledge, 2011), 13. 
2 James J. F. Forest, ed., Influence Warfare: How Terrorists and Governments Fight to Shape 
Perceptions in a War of Ideas (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2009), 1. 
3 Ronald D. Crelinsten, “The Discourse and Practice of Counter-terrorism in Liberal Democracies,” 
Australian Journal of Politics and History 44, no. 1 (1998): 389–390.  
4 Beatrice de Graaf and Bob de Graaff, “Bringing Politics Back In: The Introduction of the 
‘Performative Power’ of Counterterrorism,” Critical Studies on Terrorism 3, no. 2 (August 13, 2010): 263.  
5 Beatrice de Graaf and Bob de Graaff, 265. 
6 Rebecca Freese, “Evidence-Based Counterterrorism or Flying Blind? How to Understand and 
Achieve What Works,” Perspectives on Terrorism 8, no. 1 (2014): 48.  
2 
Furthermore, governments struggle to gather public support for strategies to prevent an 
attack that has not yet happened and about which the community is not concerned.7 Even 
without an actual decline in terrorist violence, de Graaf notes, “counterterrorism 
disappears off the public and political agenda by the rise of new social crises, a change of 
government, or a decline in the shock value caused by terrorist actions.”8 Due to the 
impact public opinion has on developing counterterrorism strategies, mobilizing public 
support is essential. The United States should increase its focus on the process of 
countering terrorism and on the narratives it produces. This hypothesis is tested in this 
thesis.  
The mutual counterterrorism efforts of American intelligence agencies, law 
enforcement, and the military on the battlefield have downgraded terrorist leadership, 
disturbed terrorist financing, and foiled terrorist plots.9 Notwithstanding its military and 
intelligence accomplishments, the United States has not shown the capacity to counter the 
ideology underlying terrorism. Having spent an enormous amount of money on 
counternarratives and fighting radicalization since 9/11, the United States has failed in 
offering an alternative narrative to reduce the appeal of terrorism.10  
The U.S. Department of State (DOS) focused Islamic State counternarrative 
campaigns on the group’s violence, with YouTube videos and direct messages on Twitter 
to pro–Islamic State accounts with a stated goal “that this is actually a squalid, worthless, 
dirty thing.”11 Counter-messaging campaigns have also attempted to disparage the 
battlefield by showing hostile settings in Islamic State–controlled territories in Iraq and 
Syria. Both of these approaches focus on the Islamic State’s means of conquest, not the 
narrative of what its violence aims to achieve.  
                                                 
7 Freese, 48. 
8 De Graaf, Evaluating Counterterrorism Performance, 7. 
9 Bipartisan Policy Center, Defeating Terrorists, Not Terrorism: Assessing U.S. Counterterrorism 
Policy from 9/11 to ISIS (Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center, September 2017), 5. 
10 Bipartisan Policy Center, 14. 
11 Greg Miller and Scott Higham, “In a Propaganda War against ISIS, the U.S. Tried to Play by the 




Similarly, the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) countering violent 
extremism (CVE) strategy has focused on what causes a specific individual to choose to 
join a terrorist group or implement a terrorist attack.12 This strategy assumes that 
community members or law enforcement can identify common variables in individuals 
and intervene early in the radicalization process to stop a terrorist attack, which thus 
shifts the focus onto the recipients of the terrorists’ messages, rather than the content of 
the messages themselves.13 This approach, however, does not address the larger problem 
of eroding support for the underlying narrative.  
Even after terrorist leaders, including Osama bin Laden, were killed and other 
terrorists detained, terrorism has continued to threaten Americans and U.S. interests.14 
U.S. counterterrorism efforts, however, have done little to prevent new audiences from 
joining terrorist groups. Despite estimates that U.S. forces have killed at least 60,000 
Islamic State fighters, the U.S. government believes the group had almost as many 
members in 2017 (15,000) as it did in 2014 (20,000).15 U.S. counterterrorism policy has 
focused on preventing terrorist attacks without engaging the ideological narratives that 
validate and provoke that type of violence.16  
While it seems widely agreed upon that the U.S. counterterrorism narrative is 
failing, little empirical evidence is available describing the U.S. counter-narrative 
                                                 
12 “Countering Violent Extremism Task Force,” Department of Homeland Security, accessed May 25, 
2018, https://www.dhs.gov/cve.  
13 Nathan A. Sales, “U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy: Next Steps for the State Department,” Council on 
Foreign Relations, February 5, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/event/us-counterterrorism-strategy-next-steps-
state-department.  
14 Bipartisan Policy Center, Defeating Terrorists, 6; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon 
the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2004), 363.  
15 Christopher Woody, “‘We’re Being Pretty Darn Prolific’―Top US General Claims 60,000 ISIS 
Fighters Have Been Killed,” Business Insider, February 15, 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/us-
claims-to-have-killed-60000-isis-fighters-2017-2; Department of State Bureau of Counterterrorism and 
Countering Violent Extremism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2016 (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 2016), 410.  
16 Bipartisan Policy Center, Defeating Terrorists, 9. 
4 
strategy since 9/11 or an analytical framework for measuring its success or failure.17 This 
research is designed to contribute toward filling that gap.  
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
How effective was the U.S. counterterrorism narrative strategy in the post-9/11 
period (2001–2016)? What is an effective U.S. government counterterrorism narrative?  
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this literature review is to explore what narratives and counter-
narratives are, and how to evaluate counterterrorism strategy. First, this literature review 
examines various definitions of terrorism, and then studies how terrorist groups use 
narratives. Next, it studies the field of counternarratives, as well as how governments 
have tried to evaluate counterterrorism strategies in the past. After reviewing the 
literature, it is determined that the U.S. government has thus far failed to evaluate its 
counterterrorism strategy effectively, a gap that this thesis attempts to fill.  
1. Terrorism  
Various scholars have defined terrorism, but few agree about its causes.18 The 
most prevalent definition of terrorism is from the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations: 
“The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce 
a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political 
or social objectives.”19 Hoffman similarly defines terrorism as a strategy and a tactic 
“aimed at the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of 
                                                 
17 Joseph I. Lieberman, Ticking Time Bomb: Counter-Terrorism Lessons from the U.S. Government’s 
Failure to Prevent the Fort Hood Attack (Collingdale, PA: Diane Publishing, 2011), 25; William D. 
Casebeer and James A. Russell, “Storytelling and Terrorism: Towards a Comprehensive ‘Counter-
Narrative Strategy,’ Strategic Insights 4, no. 3 (March 2005): 4.  
18 Alex P. Schmid, Radicalisation, De-radicalisation, Counter-radicalisation: A Conceptual 
Discussion and Literature Review (The Hague, Netherlands: International Centre for Counterterrorism, 
2013), 15–17; Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 30–34.   
19 “Federal Bureau of Investigations: General Functions,” Department of Justice, Code of Federal 
Regulations, title 28 (2010 comp.): 0.85, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/CFR-2010-title28-vol1/CFR-
2010-title28-vol1-sec0-85/content-detail.html.  
5 
violence in the pursuit of political change.”20 These two widely accepted definitions 
describe terrorism as a targeted attempt to provoke fear to reach a political goal, which is 
how this thesis uses the term.  
Terrorist groups advance their strategic objectives using a variety of 
communication tactics.21 To define the violence associated with terrorism more clearly, 
Schmid and de Graaf reason that because acts of terrorism require an element of 
communication, terrorist violence is distinguishable from routine violence.22 Jenkins also 
articulates, “terrorism is theater,” which means that terrorist violence is meant not for the 
victims of the violence but for the audiences watching.23 Mueller similarly argues that 
while the direct, damaging effects of terrorism are generally limited, “the creation of 
insecurity, fear, anxiety and hysteria is central for terrorists.”24 Building on these 
arguments, Weimann surmises that due to advances in communication technologies, 
terrorist groups exploit these new opportunities to exert psychological effects on a large 
scale.25 Because terrorism is communication and meant to create fear, terrorist groups 
tailor their narratives to address the audiences of their violence.  
Terrorism should be analyzed in terms of propaganda and communication.26 
Crelinsten argues, “Communication is an integral part of the broader context within 
                                                 
20 Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 40. 
21 Bruce Hoffman, “Countering Terrorist Use of the Web as a Weapon,” Combating Terrorist Center 
Sentinel 1, no. 1 (December 2007): 1. See also Gabriel Weimann, How Modern Terrorism Uses the 
Internet, Special Report 116 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2004), 5; Steven R. 
Corman, “The Narrative Rationality of Violent Extremism,” Social Science Quarterly 97, no. 1 (March 
2016): 17.  
22 Alex P. Schmid and Janny de Graaf, Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the 
Western News Media (London: Sage, 1982), 175.    
23 Brian M. Jenkins, International Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
1974), 4. 
24 John Mueller, “Six Rather Unusual Propositions about Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 
17, no. 4 (2005): 497.  
25 Gabriel Weimann, “The Psychology of Mass-Mediated Terrorism,” American Behavioral Scientist 
52, no. 69 (2008): 70.  
26 Alex P. Schmid, Al-Qaeda’s “Single Narrative” and Attempts to Develop Counter-Narratives: The 
State of Knowledge (The Hague, Netherlands: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2014), 1.  
6 
which terrorism emerges, waxes and wanes.”27 Forest introduces a concept of influence 
warfare and argues that battles are happening daily in communication formats, such as 
online, on radio and television, and in newspapers.28 This format not only involves 
explicit strategic communications but also stories and narratives unintentionally created 
by counterterrorism programs. For example, abuse and prolonged detention at sites, such 
as Abu Ghraib or the U.S. base at Guantanamo Bay, unintentionally created the myth of a 
grand Crusader conflict against Islam.29 These stories are effective recruitment tools for 
terrorist groups.  
2. Ideology and Narrative 
It is necessary to differentiate the concepts of ideology and narrative. Drake 
defines ideology as “the beliefs, values, principles, and objectives … by which a group 
defines its distinctive political identity and aims.”30 Hall likewise defines ideology as a 
framework for people to “figure out how the social world works, what their place is in it, 
and what they ought to do.”31 To bring the concept into the terrorism framework, 
Braddock and Horgan explain that while the ideology of a terrorist group is the set of 
beliefs and values that define the group’s political objectives and steer its members’ 
actions, the process by which those core values are communicated is the narrative.32 The 
way in which the group’s fundamental beliefs and objectives―the ideology―will be 
channeled is through the context of the story, the narrative.  
                                                 
27 Ronald D. Crelinsten, “Analyzing Terrorism and Counterterrorism: A Communication Model,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 14, no. 2 (2002): 110.  
28 Forest, Influence Warfare, 2. 
29 Xander Kirke, “Violence and Political Myth: Radicalizing Believers in the Pages of Inspire 
Magazine,” International Political Sociology 9 (2015): 284. See also Casebeer and Russell, “Storytelling 
and Terrorism,” 11. 
30 C. J. M. Drake, “The Role of Ideology in Terrorists’ Target Selection,” Terrorism and Political 
Violence 10 (1998): 55.  
31 Stuart Hall, “Signification, Representation, Ideology: Althusser and the Post-Structuralist Debates,” 
Critical Studies in Mass Communication 2 (1985): 99.  
32 Kurt Braddock and John Horgan, “Towards a Guide for Constructing and Disseminating 
Counternarratives to Reduce Support for Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 39, no. 5 (2016): 
383.  
7 
Though social science scholars have conducted research on narrative for decades, 
they do not agree on a definition for the term. Abbott asserts, “Narrative is the 
representation of events, consisting of story and narrative discourse . . . and narrative 
discourse is those events as represented.”33 Alternatively, as a broader understanding of 
the term, Seeger and Sellnow define narratives as “fundamental processes that humans 
use to shape meaning, understanding and action.”34 In other words, narratives offer a 
structure to promote a past, present, and future. Hinyard and Kreuter conceive of 
narrative as a coherent story that provides context, raises questions, and provides 
resolution.35 While these definitions vary, this thesis uses narrative as a representation of 
a story or events that provides context, meaning, and understanding.  
a. Terrorists’ Use of Narratives 
Terrorist groups use narratives to persuade people to change their worldview and 
beliefs to align with theirs. This communication strategy persuades target audiences to 
adopt beliefs and attitudes, thereby increasing their potential for future involvement in 
terrorist acts.36 Though scholars agree that the potential for someone to engage in 
terrorism increases after exposure to terrorist group narratives, few have evaluated how 
an individual who chooses to participate in violent activity is influenced by specific 
terrorist narratives in a quantitative method.37 Braddock and Horgan assert that 
radicalization is the process of changing people’s beliefs and attitudes, within the context 
                                                 
33 H. Porter Abbott, The Cambridge Introduction to Narrative, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 19.  
34 Matthew W. Seeger and Timothy L. Sellnow, Narratives of Crisis: Telling Stories of Ruin and 
Renewal (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016), 17.  
35 Leslie J. Hinyard and Matthew W. Kreuter, “Using Narrative Communication as a Tool for Health 
Behavior Change: A Conceptual, Theoretical, and Empirical Overview,” Health Education and Behavior 
34, no. 5 (2007): 778.  
36 Jeffry R. Halverson, Harold Lloyd Goodall Jr., and Steven R. Corman, Master Narratives of Islamic 
Extremism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 11–12. 
37 Braddock and Horgan, “Towards a Guide,” 385. See also Richard Bennett Furlow and Harold Lloyd 
Goodall Jr., “The War of Ideas and the Battle of Narratives: A Comparison of Extremist Storytelling 
Structures,” Cultural Studies Critical Methodologies 11, no. 3 (2011): 222; Steven R. Corman, 
“Understanding the Role of Narrative as Extremist Strategic Communication,” in Countering Violent 
Extremism: Scientific Methods and Strategies, ed. Laurie Fenstermacher and Todd Leventhal (Dayton, OH: 
Air Force Research Laboratory, 2011), 41.  
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of terrorism.38 Moghaddam argues that radicalization is like a stepladder, a progression of 
emotional and social change that leads to involvement in acts of terror.39 On the other 
hand, McCauley and Mosalenko claim, “It is plausible that radical beliefs inspire radical 
action, but research has indicated that the connection is weak.”40 It is difficult to 
generalize how different individuals radicalize, but the power of narrative enhances the 
process by which terrorist groups change an individual’s beliefs.  
b. Counter-Narratives 
Counter-narratives challenge the ideologies of other narratives and offer 
alternatives.41 Arizona State University’s Consortium for Strategic Communication 
explores the importance of macro-level narratives, or systems of stories, to deter terrorist 
commitment.42 Others emphasize that neutralizing a terrorist narrative requires multiple 
counter-narratives.43 Although Braddock and Dillard do not identify specific features that 
determine the efficacy of narratives, they show that narratives are persuasive.44 
Furthermore, Moyer-Gusé uses entertainment theory to claim that persuasive narratives 
increase an audience’s perceived similarity with the message and reduce the following:  
• the perception that there is pressure for change 
• counter-arguing by having trustful and familiar speakers 
• the amount of content an audience can choose to avoid 
                                                 
38 Braddock and Horgan, “Towards a Guide,” 385.  
39 Fathali M. Moghaddam, “The Staircase to Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration,” American 
Psychologist 60, no. 2 (February–March 2005): 162.  
40 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Understanding Political Radicalization: The Two-
Pyramids Model,” American Psychologist 72, no. 3 (2017): 213.  
41 Braddock and Horgan, “Towards a Guide,” 385; Henry Tuck and Tanya Silverman, The Counter-
Narrative Handbook (London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2016), 4.  
42 Steven R. Corman, Angela Tretheway, and Harold Lloyd Goodall, Jr., Weapons of Mass Persuasion: 
Strategic Communication to Combat Violent Extremism (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2008), 33. 
43 Christian Leuprecht et al., “Winning the Battle but Losing the War? Narrative and Counter-Narrative 
Strategy,” Perspectives on Terrorism 3, no. 2 (2009): 32.  
44 Kurt Braddock and James P. Dillard, “Meta-Analytic Evidence for the Persuasive Effects of 
Narratives,” Communication Monographs 83, no. 4 (2016): 446.  
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• an audience’s perceived invulnerability, or an underestimation of its own 
risk45  
Forming a persuasive narrative means promoting identification (how an audience 
receives and interprets a message), psychological transportation (how narratives affect 
beliefs), or para-social interactions or relationships (how an audience interacts with and 
creates a relationship with the messenger) to conceal the narrative’s persuasive intent.46 
An effective counterterrorism narrative can be persuasive using these techniques.  
3. Evaluating Counterterrorism Strategies 
Scholars seem to agree that evaluating counterterrorism measures and strategies is 
difficult.47 Nevertheless, they disagree on what to consider when evaluating 
counterterrorism strategies. Adams, Nordhaus, and Shellenberger argue that 
counterterrorism evaluation has focused on the success of all-encompassing government 
policies and initiatives, such as enhanced interrogations and ethnic profiling, with little 
attention on evaluating specific counterterrorism programs.48 Mueller further claims that, 
as well as measuring objective facts including the number of attacks or victims, 
measuring the effectiveness of counterterrorism “should focus more on reducing fear and 
anxiety as inexpensively as possible than on objectively reducing the rather limited 
dangers terrorism is likely actually to pose.”49 In agreement, the Organization for 
Security Cooperation in Europe notes that evaluating counterterrorism policies should 
                                                 
45 Emily Moyer-Gusé, “Toward a Theory of Entertainment Persuasion: Explaining the Persuasive 
Effects of Entertainment-Education Messages,” Communication Theory 18, no. 3 (2008): 415. 
46 Jonathan Cohen, “Defining Identification: A Theoretical Look at the Identification of Audiences 
with Media Characters,” Mass Communication and Society 4, no. 3 (2001): 245; Rick Busselle and Helena 
Bilandzic, “Fictionality and Perceived Realism in Experiencing Stories: A Model of Narrative 
Comprehension and Engagement,” Communication Theory 18 (2006): 256, 272; Melanie C. Green and 
Timothy C. Brock, “The Role of Transportation in the Persuasiveness of Public Narratives,” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 79, no. 5 (2000): 701; Moyer-Gusé, “Toward a Theory of Entertainment 
Persuasion,” 411.  
47 Cynthia Lum, Leslie W. Kennedy, and Alison Sherley, “Is Counter-Terrorism Policy Evidence 
Based? What Works, What Harms, and What is Unknown,” Psicothema 20, no. 1 (2008): 41.  
48 Nick Adams, Ted Nordhaus, and Michael Shellenberger, Counterterrorism since 9/11: Evaluating 
the Efficacy of Controversial Tactics (Oakland, CA: Breakthrough Institute, 2011), 6. 
49 Mueller, “Six Rather Unusual Propositions about Terrorism,” 496.  
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also measure the resilience in society to reject terrorist ideologies.50 Measuring 
counterterrorism strategy should include an assessment of the counter-narratives 
produced and their influence.  
De Graaf furthers this research by analyzing the performative power of a range of 
counterterrorism activities by government officials, as well as applying discourse analysis 
to find the degree to which governments are able to organize support for policies.51 De 
Graaf analyzed the “role of the government in ‘marketing’ counterterrorism, in 
constructing social reality, and affecting the social impact of terrorism,” and identified 14 
factors to evaluate counterterrorism policies.52 She analyzed those factors against 
terrorism and deaths from terrorism in the 1970s in the United States, Italy, the 
Netherlands, and West Germany.53 De Graaf found that governments should create 
counterterrorism strategies that counter terrorists’ narratives to neutralize and isolate the 
messages of violence.54  
As shown in this literature review, the field of counterterrorism narratives is still 
in development and little is agreed upon how to evaluate strategies or develop effective 
strategies. This thesis assesses the U.S. counterterrorism narrative in the post 9/11 period 
through 2016 and makes recommendations for a more effective counterterrorism 
narrative to use in the future.  
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis creates a framework for measuring the American government’s post-
9/11 counterterrorism narrative in the period 2001 and 2016 by using four methods: 
content analysis of U.S. presidential speeches, content analysis of DOS Twitter postings, 
an assessment of overall U.S. counterterrorism strategies, called performative power, and 
                                                 
50 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent 
Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community Policing Approach (Vienna: 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 2014), 66. 
51 De Graaf , Evaluating Counterterrorism Performance, 1, 12. 
52 De Graaf , 18.  
53 De Graaf , I. 
54 De Graaf , 250.  
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applying the social identity analytical method to two speeches delivered in November 
2016.  
First, this thesis analyzes a sample of 75 speeches given by U.S. presidents 
overseas and directed at a foreign audience between 2001 and 2016. This thesis builds on 
a Naval Postgraduate School thesis, “Message in a Battle: An Analysis of Presidential 
Communication Since 9/11,” in which Maguire analyzed 50 U.S. presidential speeches 
between 2001 and 2012.55 Based on the same sample selection criteria, this thesis added 
25 speeches given between 2013 and 2016 to analyze. The speeches are chosen based on 
the availability of the text of the speech on a government website, the geographic location 
of the speech, and the audience of the speech. The chosen speeches do not include 
speeches aimed at a domestic audience, such as campaign speeches, inauguration 
speeches, or State of the Union speeches. The sample focuses on speeches delivered 
overseas to foreign audiences composed of student or citizen groups. Following 
Maguire’s sample selection criteria, other presidential statements were chosen if 
delivered “in response to a significant national security event, such as a terrorist attack 
involving American citizens or interests, or the death of an adversary,” like a terrorist 
leader.56  
Speeches were located through the Public Papers of the Presidents series 
published by the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Upon review of the 
Public Papers volumes and White House websites, 25 speeches and statements were 
identified between 2013 and 2016 for content analysis, as listed in Appendix A. 
Appendix B details the content analysis of these 25 U.S. presidential speeches between 
2013 and 2016.  
In addition, this thesis analyzes 50 randomly selected tweets produced by the 
DOS “ThinkAgain_DOS” Twitter account posted between 2014 and 2016, which are 
listed in Appendix C. The content of each speech and tweet were analyzed. Words and 
phrases from each speech and tweet are coded into one of four categories and adapted 
                                                 
55 Jacqueline Maguire, “Message in a Battle: An Analysis of Presidential Communication since 9/11” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2013), 19. 
56 Maguire, 20.  
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from Maguire’s research: countering perceptions, undermining adversarial leadership, 
positive vision, or promoting commonality.57 Each category is then given a weighted 
index score based upon the number of times words or phrases from that category are 
found in each speech or tweet.  
• Countering perceptions: When the message aims to dispute terrorist 
narratives, based on ideology that terrorists are defending Islam against 
the West with legitimate acts of war.58  
• Undermining adversarial leadership: When the message serves to discredit 
terrorist leaders, diminish their authority and credibility, or reveal their 
hypocrisy.59  
• Positive vision: When the message is proactive and grounded in American 
ideology and not in response to others’ ideology.60 
• Promoting commonality: When the message aims to cultivate common 
interests between Americans and others in the world.61 
These weighted index scores are then averaged out by year and plotted against the 
number of terrorist attacks in the United States during that same year. The terrorist attack 
data is generated by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which defines a terrorist 
                                                 
57 Maguire, 19.  
58 Leuprecht et al., “Winning the Battle but Losing the War?” 5. 
59 Michael Jacobson, “Learning Counter-Narrative Lessons from Cases of Terrorist Dropouts,” 
Countering Violent Extremist Narratives, National Coordinator for Counterterrorism, 73, January 2010, 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/4b7aaf56ca52e.pdf; Frank J. Cilluffo, J. 
Scott Carpenter, and Matthew Levitt, What’s the Big Idea? Confronting the Ideology of Islamist Extremism 
(Washington, DC: George Washington Homeland Security Policy Institute and the Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy, 2011), 6, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/4d4eb93e776a6. 
pdf.  
60 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report, 15; 
Jerome P. Bjelopera, Countering Violent Extremism in the United States, CRS Report RL42553 
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 27, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42 
553.pdf. 
61 Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy Policy Coordinating Committee, U.S. National 
Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication (Washington, DC: National Security Council, 
2007), 3, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/state/natstrat_strat_comm.pdf. 
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attack as “threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to 
attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion or 
intimidation.”62 This thesis uses data of all terrorist attacks within the United States, 
including jihadist and domestic right wing. The GTD is open-source and includes 
information from worldwide terrorist events between 1970 and 2017. Figure 1 illustrates 
the number of all terrorist attacks in the United States per year. This thesis attempts to 
find a statistical correlation between messaging and terrorist activity, as measured by 
terrorist attacks in the United States.  
 
Figure 1. Terrorist Attacks in the United States, 2001–201663 
A statistical relationship between variables, such as speech factors and terrorist 
attacks, measures the degree to which two or more variables are related to one another. In 
other words, correlation is a statistical measure of the degree of the relationship between 
two variables.64 Finding statistical correlation between variables, however, does not mean 
                                                 
62 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism 
Database (College Park, MD: University of Maryland, 2018), 10, https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/down 
loads/Codebook.pdf.  
63 Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2018, Global 
Terrorism Database [Data file], retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd. 
64 Charles Wheelan, Naked Statistics: Stripping the Dread from the Data (London: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2013), 58.  
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causation. A positive or negative relationship “between two variables does not 
necessarily mean that a change in one of the variables is causing the change in the 
other.”65 This thesis attempts to measure correlation between speech factors and terrorist 
attacks; it does not attempt to measure causation. While correlation is a useful 
measurement tool, the relationship can be due to other factors.66 It is important to 
remember that this thesis examines the correlation coefficient to conclude if speech 
factors and terrorist attacks are related, but this thesis does not examine if one speech 
factor caused change in terrorist attacks.  
Thirdly, the thesis builds upon de Graaf’s work, which studied the American 
performative power during the 1970s, by analyzing the performative power of the U.S. 
counterterrorism policy between 2001 and 2016. For each of the years, the presence 
(coded as 1) or absence (coded as 0) of 14 factors was recorded. By answering questions 
about each factor in the affirmative (the factor is present in a given year, coded as 1) or 
the negative (the factor is not present in a given year, coded as 0), the counterterrorism 
performative power is determined by adding the number of factors present each year. The 
presence or absence of a factor was determined by looking at headlines in major national 
newspapers (such as the New York Times and the Washington Post) and the sample of 
presidential speeches. See Appendix D for the full data. 
The counterterrorism policy performative power factors are the following: 
• Priority of the topic: Do political leaders make overt statements on 
counterterrorism?  
• Level of politicization: Is counterterrorism the main concern in election 
campaigning or used politically to argue against opponents? 
• Threat demarcation: Has the threat increased, including specific terrorist 
groups and also sympathizers and broader audience sympathetic to 
terrorism? 
                                                 
65 Wheelan, 62. 
66 Wheelan, 62–63.  
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• Threat definition and presentation: Is war rhetoric used? Is the tone of 
discourse militant? 
• Link to existing discourses: Do officials or politicians make references to 
historical experiences of war or violence? 
• Public mobilization, public counterterrorism campaigns: Did officials 
create a terrorist “most wanted” list? 
• Creation and deployment of counterterrorism units: Were special units 
(not regular police forces) deployed to investigate and detain terrorists? 
• Introduction of special terrorism laws/other anti-terrorism measures: Was 
new antiterrorism legislation introduced? Were new legal categories, new 
offenses, new perpetrators introduced in legislation? 
• Revising and accentuating existing legislation: Was new legislation 
introduced not specifically aimed at terrorism? 
• Staging major terrorism trials: Were terrorism trials conducted? 
• Refusing to enter into negotiations, dialogue, reform, or integration 
activities: Were officials explicit in their refusal to engage in discussions 
or negotiations with terrorists? 
• Large mental distance: Does a lack of shared culture or ideals exist 
between terrorists and the public and does counterterrorism policy 
capitalize on this deficiency? 
• Perceived vulnerability/high risk perception for counterterrorism 
community: Do counterterrorism officials feel directly threatened 
(officials have been targeted by terrorist actions)? 
16 
• Unique level of interest and attention of counterterrorism issues compared 
to other issues: Does the issue have national priority over other topics (like 
economic issues or environmental disasters)?67 
Once the performative power of counterterrorism policy is determined per year, 
that data is plotted against terrorist attacks in the United States during the same year to 
find correlation by using a regression analysis statistical model.  
Fourthly, this thesis applies the social identity analytical method to assess 
qualitatively narratives within an overall social context. The social identity theory 
framework demonstrates how and when groups change, how a group is impacted by 
chances for communication, and how a group’s socially constructed identity may allow a 
group to change from terrorist tactics to non-violent political activity.68 Using the 
framework to look at terrorist violence in context allows analysts to interpret the message 
or messages better.69 Analysis through the framework answers, more fundamentally, why 
a leader releases a speech at a certain time, or why a group grew its membership or 
sometimes morphs into a completely different group.70  
Four analytical markers are necessary for the social identity theory framework: 
patron/client relationships, challenge/response cycles, honor/shame paradigms, and the 
limited good.71 While the four analytical markers are defined in the framework 
separately, in reality, these markers are constantly fluctuating and interdependent. Each 
action, interaction, or relationship of the terrorist group involves mishmashes of honor 
challenges, positive or negative, both concerning their patron-client relationships and 
their perception of the limited good.72 Applying the social identity analytical method 
allows an analyst to account for a group’s behavior and interactions with other groups by 
                                                 
67 De Graaf , Evaluating Counterterrorism Performance, 11–15. 
68 De Graaf , 63. 
69 De Graaf , 111. 
70 De Graaf , 121. 
71 De Graaf , 84. 
72 David Brannan, Kristen Darken, and Anders Strindberg, Practitioner’s Way Forward: Terrorism 
Analysis (Salinas, CA: Agile Press, 2014), 81. 
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studying its social context and how the group’s members comprehend themselves and 
their group in that context.73 
D. CONCLUSION 
To determine how successful the U.S. counterterrorism narrative strategy has 
been in contesting the terrorist narrative, this thesis first analyzes the U.S. narrative in the 
period between 2001 and 2016. Due to the lack of an agreed-upon evaluative framework 
for analyzing counterterrorism strategies, this thesis develops a framework based on a 
content analysis of U.S. presidential speeches and DOS tweets and the performative 
power of U.S. counterterrorism policy. After understanding what the U.S. government’s 
narrative has been in the post-9/11 period, in Chapter III this thesis applies the social 
identity analytical method to analyze narratives qualitatively within their total social 
context. Chapter IV then concludes by proposing what elements in a counterterrorism 
narrative the American government should craft to counter the terrorists’ narratives more 
effectively.  
  
                                                 
73 Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, 61. 
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II. CONTENT ANALYSIS OF U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM 
NARRATIVES 
Over the expanse of five continents throughout the coming years an 
endless struggle is going to be pursued between violence and friendly 
persuasion…Henceforth the only honourable course will be to stake 




To determine how effective the U.S. counterterrorism strategy has been, this 
thesis needs to define the U.S. narrative in the period between 2001 and 2016. To do so, 
this chapter analyzes three sets of data: U.S. presidential speeches, DOS Twitter postings, 
and an assessment of U.S. counterterrorism policy based on governmental records, 
presidential speeches, and major newspaper headlines. This chapter calculates the 
correlation coefficient between speech factors and worldwide terrorist attacks. Only one 
speech factor, promoting commonality, produced a statistically significant correlation 
with worldwide terrorist attacks, which suggests that more U.S. government narratives 
should include words or phrases that promote commonality.  
A. U.S. PRESIDENTIAL SPEECHES 
A total of 954 excerpts from the selected 75 U.S. presidential speeches were 
categorized with one of the four identified codes: countering perceptions, undermining 
adversarial leadership, positive vision, and promoting commonality. Each speech could 
have multiple coded phrases. For example, a speech could have four phrases coded as 
positive vision and two phrases coded as countering perceptions. Of this sample, the 
greatest number of phrases was labeled promoting commonality (56 percent) and the least 
number were coded as countering perceptions (5 percent). The breakdown is illustrated 
in Figure 2; the entire data set is found in Appendix B.  
                                                 
74 Alexandre de Gramont, Albert Camus: Between Hell and Reason, Essays from the Resistance 
Newspaper Combat, 1944–1947 (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1991), 138.  
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Figure 2. Percentages of Total Excerpts Associated with Each 
Category75 
Some examples of phrases from speeches coded into each of the four categories 
are discussed as follows to give the reader a sense of the analysis completed. 
1. Countering Perceptions 
From Mali to Mogadishu, senseless terrorism all too often perverts the 
meaning of Islam—one of the world’s great religions—and takes the lives 
of countless innocent Africans.76 
This phrase was coded as countering perceptions, as it disputes the perception 
fueled by terrorist ideology that Islamic extremists are defending their religion.  
                                                 
75 Data compiled from speeches listed in Appendix B. 
76 Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama at the University of Cape Town” (speech, Cape 
Town, South Africa, June 30, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/30/ 
remarks-president-obama-university-cape-town.  
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2. Undermining Adversarial Leadership 
Around the world, we’ve seen intolerance and violence and terror 
perpetrated by those who profess to be standing up for their faith, but, in 
fact, are betraying it.77 
This phrase was coded as undermining adversarial leadership, as it discredits 
terrorist leaders and reveals their hypocrisy of proclaiming to be defenders of their faith, 
but who in reality, are deceiving followers.  
3. Positive Vision 
That’s because we committed ourselves to a larger ideal, one based on a 
creed—not a race, not a nationality—a set of principles; truths that we 
held to be self-evidence that all men were created equal.78 
This phrase was coded as positive vision, as it is grounded in American ideology 
and not in response to another ideology.  
4. Promoting Commonality 
Because of the work of generations, because we’ve stood together in a 
great alliance, because people across this continent have forged a 
European Union dedicated to cooperation and peace, we have made 
historical progress toward the vision we share - a Europe that is whole and 
free and at peace.79  
This phrase was coded as promoting commonality because it echoes the 
cooperation and connections other people have with American values.  
This content analysis of presidential speeches and statements indicates that 
presidential messages delivered to foreign audiences since 9/11 have mainly been 
proactively narrative (positive vision and/or promoting commonality). The majority of 
                                                 
77 Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama in Address to the People of India” (speech, New 
Delhi, India, January 27, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/27/ 
remarks-president-obama-address-people-india. 
78 Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama in Address to the People of Europe” (speech, 
Hannover, Germany, April 25, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/25/ 
remarks-president-obama-address-people-europe. 
79 Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama to the People of Estonia” (speech, Tallinn, Estonia, 
September 3, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/03/remarks-president-
obama-people-estonia. 
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presidential speeches in this time period include a minimum of one proactive narrative 
message, which posits that the U.S. government offers its own narrative more often than 
counter-narrative messages. This analysis echoes Maguire’s findings.  
Looking further at the sampled speeches, President George W. Bush delivered 45 
percent of the speeches and President Barack Obama delivered 55 percent, as shown in 
Figure 3. As this time period only captured September 11, 2001 through December 31, 
2016, this percentage is an accurate representation of their respective years in office 
during this time period (President Bush served seven years between 2001 and 2008 and 
President Obama served eight years between 2009 and 2016). Broken down by 
presidential terms, the data shows that both presidents maintained similar percentages of 
categorized excerpts, as shown in Figure 3. Of note, President Bush delivered speeches 
with 20 percent counter-messaging narrative factors (countering perceptions and 
undermining adversarial leadership) in comparison to President Obama’s speeches with 
only 9 percent of the same. In contrast, 56 percent of President Bush’s speeches 
contained messages of promoting commonality compared to 55 percent of President 










Figure 3. Ratio of Presidential Speeches Delivered80 
For comparison purposes, the sample speeches were also defined according to the 
geographic region in which they were delivered by using DOS geographic bureaus: 18 in 
East Asia and the Pacific, 26 in Europe and Eurasia, 20 in the Western Hemisphere, five 
in Africa, four in the Near East, and two in South and Central Asia, as shown in Figure 4. 
Significant disparity occurred in the number of speeches given in different worldwide 
regions. Very few speeches were delivered in Africa, the Near East, or South and Central 
Asia, even though during this time period, U.S. counterterrorism strategy focused on 
                                                 
80 Data compiled from speeches listed in Appendix B. 
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groups in these regions, such as al Shabaab, Al Qaeda, and the Islamic State. If the 
United States was targeting counterterrorism narratives at these groups, it stands to argue 
that speeches should be delivered to populations in the regions of the world where 
recruitment to these groups is high.  
 
Figure 4. Ratio of Geographic Regions in Which the Sample 
Speeches Were Delivered81 
This data can also be used to see trends over time, as illustrated in Figure 5. The 
coded data was subsequently analyzed by year to determine how many excerpts and 
phrases from speeches per year were coded in the same four categories. This data was 
then plotted against the number of terrorist attacks in the United States, and a statistical 
regression model was used to determine if a statistically significant relationship existed 
between proactive or counter messaging in speeches and terrorist attacks. This chapter 
uses simple correlational research design to determine how strongly different variables 
are related to each other; in this instance, how strongly speech factors are related to 
terrorist attacks in the United States. Correlational studies only describe whether 
variables are related to each other; no conclusions about causality are made.  
                                                 




Figure 5. Speech Factors over Time82 
                                                 
82 Data compiled from speeches listed in Appendix B. 
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Overall, counter-messaging (phrases coded as counter perceptions or undermining 
adversarial leadership) did not affect terrorist attacks in a statistically significant manner. 
No statistically significant correlation was found with the counter-messaging categories, 
though both categories showed a negative correlation.83 In other words, when U.S. 
presidents gave speeches with high scores for counter perceptions or undermining 
adversarial leadership, the number of terrorist attacks in the United States decreased 
during that year. Two proactive messaging weighted indexes, however—positive vision 
and promoting commonality—had statistically significant correlations, as seen in  
Figure 6.84 When U.S. presidents gave speeches with a high score for positive vision, the 
number of terrorist attacks in the United States increased, though this number was not a 
very strong correlation coefficient. In contrast, when U.S. presidents gave speeches with 
a high score for promoting commonality, the number of terrorist attacks in the United 
States decreased. This correlation coefficient was very strong. This correlation is 
meaningful because speeches that include messages of commonality, as well as messages 
that echo the cooperation and connections other people have with American values, have 
a strong negative relationship with terrorist attacks in the United States.  
                                                 
83 Countering Perceptions, r = -0.3309, p-value is .2283 (not significant). Undermining Adversarial 
Leadership, r = -0.0091, p-value is .9743 (not significant).  
84 Positive Vision and Terrorist Attacks, r = .7761, p-value is .00067. Promoting Commonality, r = -
0.652, p-value is .00844. 
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Figure 6. Statistically Significant Speech Factors (Positive Vision 
and Promoting Commonality) between 2001 and 201685  
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This thesis examines correlation between variables and not causation. The 
statistical models used in this thesis were simple regression models to calculate 
correlation. Future researchers could use more advanced statistical models to define 
further the relationship between speech factors and the likelihood of terrorist attacks 
occurring. An assumed gap in time occurs between the delivery of a speech and a terrorist 
attack occurring or the delivery of a speech in response to a terrorist attack. To mitigate 
this gap, the speech factors were plotted against terrorist attacks that occurred in the 
following year in the United States. The only speech factor that had a statistically 
significant, positive relationship with terrorist attacks was positive vision. When U.S. 
presidents gave speeches with messages of positive vision, terrorist attacks in the United 
States in the following year increased.86 This measurement of correlation, by looking at 
the number of terrorist attacks occurring in the United States in the following year, may 
be a better indicator of the gap of time between speech delivery and a terrorist attack 
occurring, though this thesis focuses on the relationship between speech factors and 
terrorist attacks in the United States occurring in the same year.  
This data analysis does have caveats. Only one researcher read the speeches and 
coded phrases according to an understanding of the categories as described in Chapter I. 
More robust content analysis may include multiple researchers coding the content to 
ensure personal bias is not skewing the data analysis. Additionally, this chapter tested the 
correlation between messaging and worldwide terrorist attacks per year (from the GTD), 
but found no statistically significant relationship with that indicator.87 Future researchers 
may want to study other indicators of terrorist activity (such as recruitment numbers) to 
see if a statistical correlation exists between U.S. messaging and terrorist activity.  
                                                 
86 Correlation between positive vision and terrorist attacks in the United States occurring in the 
following year (r = 0.8109, p-value = 0.0002, significant). Correlation between weighted score of positive 
vision and terrorist attacks in the United States occurring in the following year (r = 0.6475, p-value = 0.009, 
significant) 
87 Correlations between worldwide terrorist attacks and: positive vision (r = .4681, p-value = .0785, not 
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The GTD also includes terrorist attacks in the United States per year, including 
those perpetrated by right-wing extremists. The messaging in speeches analyzed by this 
thesis only focused on messaging directed to foreign audiences. The inclusion of terrorist 
attacks conducted by right-wing extremists in the United States could be skewing the 
data. Seth Jones of the Center for Strategic and International Studies notes, “the number 
of attacks from right-wing extremists since 2014 has been greater than attacks from 
Islamic extremists.”88 Because this thesis included all terrorist attacks inside the United 
States, such an increase in attacks conducted by right-wing extremist groups could have 
affected the correlation analysis.  
The differentiation in the proactive messaging requires some analysis. Speeches 
with high scores for positive vision correlate with a higher number of terrorist attacks, 
while speeches with high scores for promoting commonality correlate with a lower 
number of terrorist attacks. In the future, more messaging should include narratives that 
promote commonality to reduce the number of terrorist attacks. However, this could also 
be because the majority of speeches during this period that included messaging promote 
commonality (56 percent of total excerpts). Additionally, other factors need to be 
considered, such as the launch of a major U.S. military offensive in Iraq or Afghanistan 
that could have inspired attacks or the rise of right-wing domestic terrorists in the United 
States.89  
In conclusion, measuring the U.S. government’s counterterrorism messaging in 
the post-9/11 time period provides a basis for lessons learned. Analyzing both qualitative 
data (showing that U.S. presidential speeches mostly provide a proactive message) and 
quantitative data (showing that a strong negative relationship exists between messages of 
promoting commonality and terrorist attacks) will help to develop better, more targeted 
recommendations for U.S. counterterrorism strategies in the future.  
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B. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE TWITTER POSTINGS 
The DOS launched a “Think Again Turn Away” campaign on Twitter in 
December 2013, as an effort to enter the war of ideas on social media. The “Think Again 
Turn Away” Twitter account had, at its peak, over 7,300 followers and tweeted about six 
to seven tweets per day.90 The account used two approaches: tweeting counter messaging 
material and addressing prominent terrorist accounts. The Islamic State, in contrast, 
“released 845 audiovisual campaigns between January 2014 and September 2015, or 
more than one every day for a year and a half.”91 Of these audiovisual productions, more 
than 15 percent emulated Western popular culture films, video games, and music video 
clips, such as The Matrix, Call of Duty, American Sniper, and Grand Theft Auto.92 When 
ISIS videos show executions, “40 percent feature highly salient cultural images … 
transform[ing] victims of terrorism into actors in Western popular culture products, 
aimed at engaging with their global audiences and making terror popular.”93 The content 
released by the DOS fails in comparison to the quality produced by the Islamic State.  
After releasing a video, “Welcome to ISIS Land,” the DOS was mocked 
mercilessly for using footage produced by the Islamic State as a tongue-in-cheek way to 
subvert the idea that recruitment is worthy.94 This approach failed miserably, as it seemed 
the U.S. government adopted the terrorists’ handbook. Worse, it showed that the U.S. 
government lacked a basic understanding of groups like the Islamic State, which were 
purposefully using these exact scenes of execution, mimicking Western popular culture, 
as recruitment propaganda.95 Other examples demonstrated the U.S. government’s failure 
to understand the context of its messaging or the broader terrorist landscape.96 Failing to 
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understand the context surrounding these terrorist groups, the U.S. government’s 
narrative messaging was not only a waste of time and money, but counterproductive.  
The “ThinkAgain_DOS” Twitter account was disabled in March 2016 and past 
postings were removed from the Twitter website. While the Library of Congress was 
collecting tweets posted beginning in 2006, none has been made public yet.97 The 
Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine captures snapshots of websites in time, including 
the “ThinkAgain_DOS” Twitter account, though not in its entirety. For the time period 
2014 through 2016, the Wayback Machine maintained archives of the account by day, 
with a total of 129 days of archived material for the “ThinkAgain_DOS” account.  
A random calculator tool selected 50 days, of which the first Twitter posting of 
the day was chosen. The 50 DOS “ThinkAgain_DOS” Twitter postings were categorized 
with one of the four identified codes (counter perceptions, undermining adversarial 
leadership, positive vision, or promoting commonality), with the greatest number labeled 
countering perceptions (43 percent) and the least number coded as positive vision (7 
percent). The breakdown is illustrated in Figure 7; the entire data set is found in 
Appendix C.  
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Figure 7. Percentages of Tweets Associated with Each Category98 
Tweets are significantly shorter than speeches (140 characters), which makes 
content analysis challenging. Tweets are often a sentence or two with context being 
provided in prior or subsequent tweets. This thesis was constrained by choosing the first 
tweet of each day to analyze. No further tweets were analyzed. For example, if a DOS 
tweet was in response to someone else’s tweet, this thesis only analyzed the content of 
the DOS tweet. If the DOS was retweeting someone else’s tweet, that content was not 
analyzed.  
In sharp contrast to the content analysis of U.S. presidential speeches, the DOS’ 
Twitter account mostly used counter-messaging (aimed at countering perceptions or 
undermining adversarial leadership). Eighty-three percent of DOS tweets used counter-
messaging phrases, in comparison to U.S. presidential speeches, of which 88 percent used 
proactive messaging phrases, directed at providing a positive vision or promoting 
commonality with the United States. This percentage could validate many arguments that 
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the Twitter campaign was ineffective because it regularly engaged in petty disputes with 
fighters and supporters of terrorist groups.99  
Due to the archival restraints on the sample size, the thesis could not conduct 
statistically significant correlation research of content analysis of the Twitter postings 
with terrorist attacks. The sample size was simply too small. Future researchers could 
aggregate more data related to each tweet, analyze the number of re-tweets each posting 
received (to show further influence as re-tweets are found by more than just the DOS 
account followers) or find more archived Twitter material. Additionally, the correlation 
could be analyzed to determine relationships between narrative messaging factors and 
another measurement of terrorist activity, such as terrorist group recruitment numbers or 
violent incidents.  
C. U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM PERFORMATIVE POWER 
The performative power of counterterrorism strategy aims to measure the “social 
visibility” of counterterrorism measures to establish a correlation between the amount of 
“social drama generated” and terrorist attacks.100 The 14 factors described previously to 
measure governmental counterterrorism activities determine “the performative power of 
counterterrorism policies.”101 This thesis constructed an assessment of the 14 factors by 
studying governmental records, the sample of presidential speeches, and headlines from 
major national newspapers (the New York Times and the Washington Post). The presence 
(coded as 1) or absence (coded as 0) of each of the 14 factors is established per year. The 
sum of these factors is indicated per year on a timeline from 2001 to 2016, and can be 
found in Appendix D.  
Every year was separately examined in terms of the role these factors did or did 
not play. For example, to assess the factor, “Priority of the topic,” this thesis answered 
the question, “Do political leaders personally and explicitly express themselves on the 
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counterterrorism issue?” If a headline in a major national newspaper (the New York Times 
or the Washington Post) in a calendar year included the president, vice president, or 
congressperson making a statement about counterterrorism, it was considered a factor 
present for the year (coded as 1). Sometimes an indicator of performativity, such as the 
staging of terrorism trials, lasted longer than one year. That factor was coded for more 
than one year at a time. The performative power (ranging from 1 to 14) was then 
analyzed against the number of terrorist attacks in the United States occurring in the 
following year, based on GTD data, as illustrated in Figure 8. The GTD data includes all 
terrorist attacks within the United States, regardless of the type of terrorist group.  
 
Figure 8. Performative Power of U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy102 
Although technically a positive correlation (the higher the performative power of 
counterterrorism strategies, the more terrorist attacks also increase), the relationship 
between performative power and terrorist attacks was not statistically significant.103 This 
finding is in contrast to de Graaf’s study of the United States in the 1970s, where she 
found that a “decline in the performative effect of counterterrorism policy preceded a 
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distinct reduction in the number of terrorist actions in the following year.”104 This thesis 
is unable to prove that the performative power of counterterrorism policy can contribute 
predictions for the number of terrorist attacks in a country. 
This thesis focuses on the time period between 2001 and 2016, during which the 
predominant U.S. counterterrorism measures targeted al Qaeda and the Islamic State. De 
Graaf does note that the “correlation only applies when the terrorist groups at stake 
operate within the same society and against the same government that initiated the 
countermeasures.”105 The terrorist attack data compiled from the GTD, however, includes 
terrorist attacks conducted by all types of terrorist groups. The data in this thesis might 
have had a stronger correlation if the measurement of terrorist attacks inside the United 
States had only included attacks conducted by, or inspired by, the Islamic State or al 
Qaeda instead of the total aggregate data. In an attempt to mitigate this measurement bias, 
this thesis also plotted U.S. performative power against all terrorist attacks worldwide 
(data from GTD). While the correlation was positive (the higher the performative power 
of counterterrorism strategies, the higher the number of terrorist attacks worldwide), the 
relationship was, again, not statistically significant.106  
Other explanations may shed light on this data. Other counterterrorism measures 
with belated consequences may account for the decrease in terrorist attacks, such as local 
police department missions, community intervention, or counterintelligence measures. 
Additionally, this thesis did not attempt to measure intensity of the different 14 factors. 
This thesis used a presence or absence binary measurement for each factor. In other 
words, this thesis did not account for the fact that certain years could have been more 
intense (more terrorism trials or higher levels of public mobilization in a certain year). 
Future researchers may be able to provide more detailed accounts of performativity by 
using a ranking scale to measure intensity of factors or monthly or weekly counts, to 
enhance the statistical value of the data.  
                                                 
104 De Graaf , Evaluating Counterterrorism Performance, 138. 
105 De Graaf , 140. 
106 r = .2362, p-value is 0.3967, not statistically significant. 
36 
D. CONCLUSION 
Any recommendations for an improved U.S. strategy on counterterrorism 
narratives must be grounded in lessons learned from the U.S. narrative from 2001 
through 2016. This thesis analyzed U.S. presidential speeches, DOS Twitter postings, and 
a comprehensive measurement of U.S. performative power during this time period. The 
only speech factor with a strong statistical correlation to terrorist attacks in the United 
States during the same year was promoting commonality. The only speech factor with a 
strong statistical correlation to terrorist attacks in the United States in the year following 
the speeches was positive vision. When U.S. presidential speeches included more 
messages that cultivate commonality with foreign audiences, terrorist attacks in the 
United States in that year decreased. Although not a causal measurement, this simple 
statistical model demonstrates a negative relationship between these two variables. When 
U.S. presidential speeches included more messages with a positive vision, terrorist 
attacks in the United States in the following year increased.  
When crafting a comprehensive counterterrorism narrative, the U.S. government 
may be wasting its time with counter-messaging narratives (such as countering 
perceptions or undermining adversarial leadership) because these factors had no 
correlation, positive or negative, with terrorist attacks. This result further suggests that 
the DOS’ Twitter campaign was useless, with the majority of its tweets containing such 
counter-messaging narratives. Having laid out these quantitative analyses of counter-
messaging effects, the next chapter examines a qualitative analysis of a broad 
counternarrative framework using the social identity analytical method.  
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III. A FRAMEWORK TO EVALUATE U.S. 
COUNTERTERRORISM NARRATIVES 
The secret of war lies in the communications. 
—Napoleon Bonaparte107  
 
The quantitative analyses in the prior chapter did not account for the overall 
context of terrorist activity. Developing a comprehensive counterterrorism narrative 
strategy requires a framework to interpret U.S. counterterrorism narratives within their 
total social context. It is critical to evaluate narrative messages in the totality of the social 
reality. According to Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, the “tactics, targeting, the level of 
violence, willingness to negotiate, support structures, political agendas, and strategic 
objectives are all framed by the social realities within which terrorists exist.”108 This 
thesis first explains the SOCIAL identity analytical method, and then applies the social 
identity theory framework to analyze both the U.S. government narrative and that of a 
terrorist group, the Islamic State, to determine whether this framework is a useful 
evaluative tool.  
A. DEFINITION AND APPLICATION OF FRAMEWORK  
1. Social Identity Analytical Method (Social Identity Theory and the 
Analytical Markers) 
The social identity theory framework demonstrates how and when groups change, 
how a group is impacted by chances for communication, and how a group’s socially 
constructed identity may allow a group to change from terrorist tactics to non-violent 
political activity.109 Using the framework to look at terrorist violence in context allows 
analysts to interpret the message or messages better.110 Analysis through the framework 
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answers, more fundamentally, why a leader releases a speech at a certain time, or why a 
group grew its membership or sometimes morphs into a completely different group.111  
Four analytical markers are used in the social identity analytical method: 
patron/client relationships, challenge/response cycles, honor/shame paradigms, and the 
limited good.112 While the four analytical markers are defined in the framework 
separately, in reality, these markers are constantly fluctuating and interdependent. Each 
action, interaction, or relationship of the terrorist groups involves mishmashes of honor 
challenges, positive or negative, concerning both their patron-client relationships and 
their perception of the limited good.113 Applying the social identity analytical method 
allows an analyst to account for a group’s behavior and interactions with other groups by 
studying its social context and how the group’s members comprehend themselves and 
their group in that context.114 
This chapter analyzes two speeches through the social identity theory framework: 
one by the leader of the Islamic State, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and one by then-U.S. 
President Barack Obama, delivered between November and December 2016.  
2. Apply Social Identity Analytical Method to Islamic State Speech 
On November 2, 2016, the Islamic State released a speech by Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi, entitled, “This Is What Allah and His Messenger Promised Us,” and on 
November 11, the Islamic State’s English-language magazine, Rumiya, printed an 
English transcript of the speech.115 Placed in context, in November 2016, Iraqi troops 
were about to enter Mosul for the first time since the Islamic State had seized it more 
than two years prior. The speech calls on Islamic State fighters to hold their ground in 
Mosul, in the face of Coalition and Iraqi troops.  
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The limited good in this context is the physical and political control of the land in 
and around Mosul, a city in Iraq that holds major symbolic significance.116 al-Baghdadi 
declared the caliphate of the Islamic State in Mosul in 2014. It was also the last major 
urban center under Islamic State control in Iraq at this time. In this November 2016 
speech, al-Baghdadi is reiterating to his in-group that, for him, nothing has changed. He 
restates that the goals of the Islamic State remain the same: fight the Shia; fight the 
Alawites. This speech is a good example of al-Baghdadi, the leader, attempting to 
maintain the in-group’s attachment to the Islamic State, to forestall the group’s members 
from questioning or reevaluating the meaningfulness of in-group membership.117 This 
speech is also a message to the out-group, which proclaims the in-group commitment in 
the face of adversity and distinguishes who is and who is not part of that group. The 
speech provides an in-group narrative for those fighting, but also to those just living 
under the rule of the Islamic State. It clearly delineates how the in-group distinguishes 
between what out-groups may mistakenly categorize as similar.  
al-Baghdadi is also encouraging Islamic State supporters around the world to 
remain steadfast in fighting, in addition to calling for attacks in Saudi Arabia and Turkey 
or beyond. If individuals are unable to come to fight in Syria or Iraq, al-Baghdadi 
reminds supporters that martyrdom in Libya or the West is just as glorious, which gives 
the larger in-group a purpose, an honor paradigm. This call to multi-national Islamic 
State support suggests the global nature that the in-group seeks to advance. The Western 
nation-state divisions are not authoritative to the Islamic State in-group. Rather, the 
patron/client relationship between al-Baghdadi, the Islamic State, and the people willing 
to fight for and live under their rule, regardless of national location, is the determining 
identifier within the in-group.  
The speech includes many references to early Islamic history, another honor 
paradigm for members of the current group. These are assurances by al-Baghdadi that 
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those Islamic State fighters who are unwavering in the fight for Mosul will be celebrated 
in the historical, religious narrative.118 Al-Baghdadi’s words suggest that the fight for 
Mosul is a re-enactment of the Battle of the Trench, fought in A.D. 627.119 The speech’s 
title itself quotes a Quranic verse, the Surah al-Ahzab.120 In the months prior to the 
release of this speech in 2016, many Islamic State followers online equated the battle for 
Mosul to the battle between the Prophet Muhammad and the Jewish clans, the Ahzab.121 
The in-group narrative is that the Prophet Muhammad overcame enormous disadvantages 
on the battlefield with clever tactics.122 The in-group will maintain confidence from this 
analogy between past and present that, as Muhammad succeeded against all odds, the 
Islamic State will triumph.  
al-Baghdadi refers twice to this Battle of the Trench, in addition to its title. The 
first reference reminds supporters that the challenging, righteous path is “a sign of the 
clear conquest that Allah [God] has promised.”123 The coalition fighting the Islamic 
State, one of many out-groups, outnumbers its fighters immensely, which further 
strengthens comparisons to the Battle of the Trench. These fights are essential to purify 
the ranks of believers, indeed, that “most of them were not to be believers.”124 The 
second reference to the Quranic verse urges Islamic State fighters to remain resolute, that 
those who become “weak in waging jihad” are trading paradise for short-lived benefits in 
this world.125 This clear messaging is directed toward the in-group to retain its members 
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and try to redress any concerns that may cause some of its members dissatisfaction, such 
as impending destruction in battle.126 
If al-Baghdadi is concerned enough about rallying his troops, it may be seen as an 
opportunity for the United States to push messaging that challenges the imbalance 
between members of the Islamic State in-group and the Coalition troop out-group. First, 
it is important to understand the Islamic State members’ “dominant sources of social 
identification and how they compare in status and strength with other competing sources 
of social identification.”127 Al-Baghdadi’s speech in November 2016, in an attempt to 
rally troops to stay in Mosul and fight, shows that it may be time to try to challenge their 
other sources of social identification, to the point where Islamic State members decide 
that their membership in the terrorist group is no longer a positive. The challenge and 
response paradigm is not one only between the Coalition and Islamic State, however. 
Effective messaging is not going to be in admitting the out-group is right but in de-
categorization, re-categorization, or cross-categorization of members of the in-group to 
something else, perhaps, into a non-violent yet counter Coalition group. The challenge is 
for the United States to respond with a counter-narrative that not only clarifies that 
membership in the Islamic State does not add positive value to identity, but also suggests 
alternatives to the Islamic State that do not require the members to perceive themselves to 
be traitors.  
With this speech, al-Baghdadi is presenting himself as the leader of the 
underdogs, who aims for triumph both on the battlefield and for superiority over terrorists 
worldwide, and establishes potential, future patron/client relationships. After the Battle of 
the Trench, the Prophet Muhammad established himself and Islam as a superior force, 
above the Prophet’s enemies in Mecca and opposition factions within Medina.128 The in-
group narrative is that a victory by the Islamic State in Mosul over Coalition troops 
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would raise the enduring stature of the Islamic State on a worldwide scale.129 Rival Sunni 
terrorist groups would also, in the in-group narrative, then recognize that al-Baghdadi 
deserves their obedience on the basis of doing what is seen as tactically impossible. 
Because al-Baghdadi made this speech in anticipation of receiving the 
subservience of rival terrorist groups after an Islamic State victory in Mosul, it could 
have been an opportune time for the U.S. government to present a counter-message to 
other rival terrorist groups to highlight tensions and outright hostilities against the Islamic 
State. President Obama repeatedly made comments that the Islamic State had killed 
mostly Muslims.130 The speeches delivered by al-Baghdadi, however, clearly distinguish 
what is and what is not a “true” Muslim; certainly, Shia Muslims are outside this group. 
Al Qaeda followers, even though they are Sunni Muslims, were pushed out of the in-
group because they would not submit to the leadership of al-Baghdadi. The U.S. 
government analysts are completely missing some subgroups. The counter narrative is 
thus inaccurately applied because the U.S. government has failed to understand the in-
group nuances that the in-group members understand.  
3. Apply Social Identity Analytical Method to U.S. Presidential Speech 
On December 6, 2016, then-President Barack Obama gave remarks during the 
Coalition and Iraqi troop fight for Mosul in Iraq at MacDill Air Force Base entitled, “The 
Administration’s Approach to Counterterrorism. While the overall speech was not 
directed at the Islamic State nor directed at an overseas audience, the speech is a good 
example of an American response to the fight for Mosul.  
First, President Obama presents an honor challenge to the members of the Islamic 
State, by framing the group as a “terrorist network and an insurgency.”131 By defining the 
out-group in these terms and refusing to describe them even as a group, the president is 
rejecting their in-group definition as a caliphate or state, thereby questioning their entire 
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mission. Similarly, President Obama refuses to acknowledge the Islamic State in their 
words, as the culmination of a centuries-old fight to return to the glorious days of the 
Prophet. In contrast, he describes the rise of the Islamic State as due to a failing Iraqi 
government and armed forces, a dictator in Syria, and social media.132 The president is 
attempting to dissuade members of the Islamic State that they belong to anything special. 
In fact, they belong to a network of people that simply have grievances against poorly run 
governments and he is challenging the group members’ patronage network.  
President Obama does not even name the Islamic State leader, al-Baghdadi, in the 
speech, and offers an honor challenge to the leader and his patron/client relationships. 
Instead, he calls against “false prophets [who] are peddling a vision of Islam that is 
irreconcilable with tolerance and modernity and basic science” and “thugs and 
murderers,” and confronts the group’s integrity.133 These definitions have the added 
benefit of reminding the President’s in-group, in this case, the U.S. armed forces, that 
they have the upper hand as the “strongest fighting force the world has ever known.”134 
Thus, the troops are rallied and the ego of the in-group bolstered to continue to stay and 
fight. Not only is the U.S. military more powerful than the Islamic State “network,” but 
also “they don’t pose an existential threat to our nation, and we must not make the 
mistake of elevating them as if they do.”135 The limited good in this instance is the 
opinion of the larger out-group. It is a reminder to the American public that the Islamic 
State does not fundamentally threaten the United States. Short-term losses may occur in 
the field of battle, in Iraq or Syria, but the United States will survive, stronger than ever.  
Secondly, President Obama lays out a narrative about his in-group, the American 
people. He defines Americans as being “defined by hope, and not fear.”136 The in-group 
is strengthened by the repeated assurances that the history and legacy of the United States 
is unwavering. The president also acknowledges that the in-group is not defined by 
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religion. He challenges the Islamic State’s social identity as the leader of Muslims by 
reminding us, “they do not speak for over a billion Muslims around the world, and they 
do not speak for American Muslims, including many who wear the uniform of the United 
States of America’s military.”137 The President reinforces that Muslims have different 
social identities; that they can have stronger identities than that of the Islamic State. 
There are stronger social identities, especially that of being an American, and further, 
being a member of the American military. It is challenging to the Islamic State, which 
has sought to advance a global network in-group that defies the authoritarian nature of 
Western nation-state divisions. The President is issuing a challenge to that network by 
reinforcing the superiority of the United States as a nation-state, and the American 
military as the defender of that nation-state. This statement, however, misses the 
distinction that the Islamic State makes between “true” Muslims and others, by 
continuing to group all Muslims together.  
In an attempt to define the in-group further and present an honor challenge to the 
Islamic State, President Obama clearly distinguishes the out-group, terrorists, from 
anyone else who believes in “the universal right to speak your mind and to protest against 
authority … [or living in] a country where you’re judged by the content of your character, 
rather than what you look like, or how you worship, or what your last name is, or where 
your family came from.”138 This distinction is in stark contrast to reports of the Islamic 
State punishment for civilians who broke the laws or defectors.139 By describing the 
Islamic State’s rule as authoritarian in nature, the President is challenging its notion of 
the glory days of Islam by publicly shaming those leaders who refuse these universal 
rights. Similarly, the President is sending a message to the patrons of other terrorist 
groups, such as governments claiming leadership over terrorist groups who rival the 
Islamic State that the United States will not crumble in the face of the Islamic State. 
Moreover, if these patrons, and their client terrorist groups, do not present an existential 
                                                 
137 Obama.  
138 Obama.  
139 Rukmini Callimachi, “The ISIS Files,” New York Times, April 4, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/ 
interactive/2018/04/04/world/middleeast/isis-documents-mosul-iraq.html. 
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honor challenge to the United States, the U.S. government may be open to non-violent 
alternatives.  
Group members must receive a positive social identity from their group that is 
distinct from other groups; if not, the group will fail to exist.140 After the United States 
failed to capitalize on the narrative opportunities presented previously in 2016 by 
suggesting non-violent alternatives to the Islamic State for its in-group members, former 
Islamic State members are now joining al Qaeda ranks, following rapid battlefield 
failures to maintain caliphate ground.141 Even more bizarrely, former Islamic State 
fighters are joining forces with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a collection of 
mostly Shiite militias in Iraq. On face value, that type of collaboration should never 
happen. However, after deeper analysis, both sides can reap tangible benefits. Islamic 
State fighters, shunned by families and friends, can re-enter Iraqi society, while the PMF 
are able to expand into Sunni areas.142 Had the U.S. government been conducting this 
ongoing analysis, it may have been able to target narrative messaging to ensure former 
Islamic State fighters joined a different positive-value, non-violent group, instead of 
another terrorist group.  
B. CONCLUSION 
Narrative messages must be interpreted within their total social context. As 
presented in the fight over Mosul that began in November 2016, the two sides presented 
two opposing narratives, one of a U.S. president and the other of an Islamic State leader. 
Using the social identity analytical method framework to analyze the narratives illustrates 
that appropriated, rather than ascribed, in-group identifications continue to make a 
difference between terrorist groups, governments, and religious identifications more 
broadly, and that the U.S. government has failed to understand these nuances or to react 
                                                 
140 Brannan, Darken, and Strindberg, A Practitioner’s Way Forward, 75. 
141 Jason Burke, “Al-Qaida Moves In to Recruit from Islamic State and Its Affiliates,” Guardian, 
January 19, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/19/al-qaida-recruit-from-islamic-state-
affiliates-isis.  
142 Vera Mironova and Mohammed Hussein, “Islamic State Fighters Are Back, and This Time They’re 
Taking up Arms with Shiite Militias,” Foreign Policy, October 15, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/ 
10/15/islamic-state-fighters-are-back-and-this-time-theyre-taking-up-arms-with-shiite-militias/.  
46 
correctly to the broader terrorist landscape. In the next chapter, this thesis proposes the 
recommendations for implementing a new comprehensive counterterrorism narrative.  
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS, IMPLEMENTATION, AND 
CONCLUSION 
U.S. counterterrorism narrative strategy from the post-9/11 period from 2001 to 
2016 has proved largely ineffective. A content analysis of 75 U.S. presidential speeches 
and 50 DOS Twitter postings, and a comprehensive measurement of U.S. performative 
power, suggest a reason for that failure: the only narrative factor with a negative 
correlation with terrorist attacks was promoting commonality. Increased messaging with 
this factor is correlated to a decrease in terrorist attacks. To understand when to use this 
messaging more fully, this thesis applied an evaluative framework, the social identity 
analytical method, to two speeches, one delivered by the Islamic State leader, Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi in November 2016 and one delivered by U.S. President Obama in December 
2016, which demonstrated that the U.S. government has neither succeeded in 
understanding the terrorist in-group identification nuances nor in appropriately reacting to 
the larger terrorist social context. This analysis showed that to target messaging 
effectively, the framework should be applied on a consistent basis. Although this thesis 
did not show a relationship between performative power and terrorist attacks, this metric 
helps to show how narrative fits into a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy.  
A. RECOMMENDATIONS  
1. Promote Commonality  
The content analysis presented at the beginning of this thesis determined that 
promoting commonality was the only narrative factor that has a negative correlation with 
terrorist attacks. The United States should deliver narratives that promote commonality 
and echo the cooperation and connections other people have with American values. For 
example, a speech could highlight shared visions of a common future, values, and 
principles like peace and progress, security and human dignity that the world could 
advance together. When the U.S. government wants to target individuals who are already 
questioning the value of maintaining membership in a terrorist group, the United States 
may target such individuals with proactive narrative messaging and promote 
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commonality. This messaging could cause an individual to reevaluate whether attachment 
to the out-group with which the terrorist group competes (in this case, the U.S., or 
Western culture) were more positive than membership of the in-group (the terrorist 
group). If so, that individual could be persuaded to re-categorize, de-categorize, or cross-
categorize to an alternative.  
Narratives will likely be viewed as an honor challenge by the terrorist in-group or 
by their patrons or clients. It is critical to understand who will respond to what part of the 
narrative message and how the out-group will view it. For example, if members of the 
terrorist in-group are questioning or reevaluating their membership in that in-group, there 
can be incentives to defect from the in-group that may potentially cause the disintegration 
of the group. The U.S. government should capitalize on these opportunities by providing 
an incentive, a narrative that causes individuals to question their membership. It is 
therefore necessary to understand why individuals choose to join the Islamic State and 
countering the narrative presented by the in-group leader to maintain membership.  
2. Counterterrorism Policy Needs to be Comprehensive (Performative 
Power) 
The way in which governments create narratives is significant as part of the 
overall counterterrorism performative power. When governments create narratives, it 
should be framed within an overall counterterrorism strategy. Both the type of 
counterterrorism policy and also the message that policy communicates to terrorists is 
critical. A strictly technical approach to measuring effectiveness, such as taking the 
number of terrorist attacks in a given year as a result of certain policies, is often too 
limited in understanding the full context. The performative power of counterterrorism 
strategies and a government’s attempts to market its counterterrorism policy are 
important in this battle of perceptions.143 
                                                 
143 De Graaf , Evaluating Counterterrorism Performance, 230. 
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3. Conduct the Social Identity Analytical Method  
Terrorist groups are simply organizations made up of people. As a result, they can 
be analyzed, understood, and countered by using evaluative tools like the social identity 
analytical method framework. To identify the optimally effective target for delivering 
narratives that promote commonality, the U.S. government should have researchers 
conducting the social identity analytical method on the various terrorist groups. The 
government must know which commonality narrative features are most effective to tell to 
whom at what time, which can only be fruitful if the government understands the larger 
social context in which terrorist groups exist.  
B. IMPLEMENTATION 
1. Create an Interagency Office 
An interagency counterterrorism office would be best established under the DHS. 
The DHS is responsible for a variety of programs and activities abroad and domestically 
to counter terrorist groups and their activities. It is better suited than the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), which focuses on intelligence analysis and has 
restrictions on activities it can engage in domestically, or the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), which has the lead on terrorist activities domestically but does not 
have the same clout or audience internationally. The DHS was created to oversee and 
coordinate comprehensive national strategies “to safeguard the country against terrorism 
and respond to any future attacks.”144 Creating an interagency counterterrorism office 
would be similar to the development of the National Vetting Center in February 2018, led 
by the DHS, which coordinates multiple federal agencies to vet individuals who seek to 
enter or remain within the United States.145 To develop a comprehensive counterterrorism 
narrative strategy, a collaborative, interagency counterterrorism office is best placed 
within the DHS.  
                                                 
144 “Creation of the Department of Homeland Security,” Department of Homeland Security, September 
24, 2015, https://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security. 
145 “The National Vetting Center,” Department of Homeland Security, April 2, 2018, https://www.dhs. 
gov/news/2018/02/06/national-vetting-center. 
50 
2. Integrate Social Identity Analytical Method Analysis 
Analysts in this office would be responsible for integrating ongoing social identity 
analytical method analysis in all areas of social groups and movements worldwide and 
domestically, as well as keeping track of opportune moments for targeting narratives. 
Due to the complex nature of this type of analysis, the social identity analytical method 
forces the researcher to specialize, or to acquire a deeper knowledge of a smaller number 
of groups. When analysts are fluent in the social identity analytical method analysis, the 
identification of opportunities, knowing what message is possible, and choosing the type 
and category will not be a bureaucratic and slow process. This counterterrorism office 
would also maintain metrics on the entire U.S. government performative power on a 
regular basis.  
3. Achieve Unified Action across Agencies 
Under one office, the interagency office would be comprised of officers from the 
DOS (for external social groups) and Department of Justice (FBI, for internal social 
movements), with liaisons from the Executive Office and the Department of Defense and 
Congress. While this thesis only studied presidential speeches, other political leaders 
make legislation and deliver speeches that explain counterterrorism policies. The 
interagency counterterrorism office must incorporate the development of 
counterterrorism narrative strategy for all those who speak on behalf of the U.S. 
government.  
Budgeting would not change. The proposed interagency office would be filled 
with already existing positions. The U.S. government would divert regular ongoing 
training funding to train its analysts on the social identity analytical method. Lastly, 
instead of producing narratives that have no correlation to a decrease in terrorist attacks 
(counter-messaging, such as undermining adversarial leadership or countering 
perceptions), the U.S. government can change its narrative messaging to promoting 
commonality, which has a negative correlation with terrorist attacks. See Table 1 for a 
summary of these policy recommendations.  
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Table 1. Summary of Policy Recommendations 
Recommendation Implementation Timeline Consequence 
1. Write narratives that 
promote commonality, 
because it is the only 
narrative factor with a 
statistical negative 
correlation with terrorist 
attacks. 
Immediately  No increase in budget. 
Change the narratives that 
are being produced to more 
of promoting commonality 
and less factors that do not 
affect terrorist attacks. 
2. Maintain metrics on 
overall performative power.  
October 1, 2019 (beginning 
of Fiscal Year 2020) 
No increase in budget. 
Transfer pre-existing 
counterterrorism analysts to 
this position. Divert annual 
training funds to provide 
analysts with training on 
performative power.  
3. Conduct Social Identity 
Analytical Method analysis 
on all social movements and 
groups worldwide.  
October 1, 2019 (beginning 
of Fiscal Year 2020) 
No increase in budget. 
Transfer pre-existing 
counterterrorism analysts to 
this office, housed at the 
U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security. Divert 
annual training funds to 
provide analysts with 
training on the framework. 
 
C. CONCLUSION 
U.S. counterterrorism narrative strategy from the post-9/11 period from 2001 to 
2016 has proved largely ineffective. Content analysis of 75 U.S. presidential speeches, 50 
DOS Twitter postings, and the measurement of U.S. performative power demonstrated 
that only the narrative factor of promoting commonality has a negative correlation with 
terrorist attacks. More messages promoting commonality correlates to decreased terrorist 
attacks. To understand when to use this messaging more fully, the social identity 
analytical method demonstrated that the U.S. government did not completely comprehend 
social in-group identification nuances. It also did not know how to react to the larger 
terrorist social context appropriately. To target messaging effectively, the framework 
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should be applied on a consistent basis, to target narrative messages that promote 
commonality within a larger comprehensive counterterrorism strategy.  
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APPENDIX A. LIST OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL SPEECHES 
SELECTED FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS (2013–2016) 
Date Location Title 




Remarks by the President at Interfaith Service in 
Boston, MA 
6/17/13 Belfast, Northern 
Ireland 
Remarks by President Obama and Mrs. Obama in 
Town Hall with Youth of Northern Ireland 
6/19/13 Berlin, Germany Remarks by President Obama at the Brandenburg 
Gate—Berlin, Germany 
6/27/13 Goree Island, 
Senegal 
Remarks by the President at Civil Society 
Organization Meeting 
6/30/13 Cape Town, South 
Africa 
Remarks by President Obama at the University of 
Cape Town 
3/26/14 Brussels, Belgium Remarks by the President in Address to European 
Youth 
4/24/14 Tokyo, Japan Remarks by President Obama to Miraikan Science 
and Youth Expo 
4/27/14 Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia 
Remarks by President Obama at the Malaysian 
Global Innovation and Creativity Center 
9/3/14 Tallinn, Estonia Remarks by President Obama to the People of 
Estonia 
11/14/14 Rangoon, Burma Remarks by President Obama at Youth Southeast 
Asian Leaders Initiative Town Hall 
11/15/14 Queensland, New 
Zealand 
Remarks by President Obama at the University of 
Queensland 
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Date Location Title 
1/27/15 New Delhi, India Remarks by President Obama in Address to the 
People of India 
4/9/15 Kingston, Jamaica Remarks by President Obama in Town Hall with 
Young Leaders of the Americas 
4/10/15 Panama City, 
Panama 
Remarks by President Obama at the Civil Society 
Forum 
7/26/15 Nairobi, Kenya Remarks by President Obama to the Kenyan 
People 
7/28/15 Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia 
Remarks by President Obama to the People of 
Africa 
11/20/15 Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia 
Remarks by the President in YSEALI Town Hall 
12/19/15 San Bernardino, 
California 
Remarks by the President After Meeting the 
Families of the Victims of the San Bernardino 
Shooting 
4/25/16 Hannover, Germany Remarks by President Obama in Address to the 
People of Europe 
5/24/16 Hanoi, Vietnam Remarks by President Obama in Address to the 
People of Vietnam 
6/13/16 Washington, D.C. Remarks by the President After Briefing on the 
Attack in Orlando, Florida 
8/3/16 Washington, D.C. Remarks by the President at the Young African 
Leaders Initiative Town Hall 
9/6/16 Vientiane, Laos Remarks of President Obama to the People of Laos 
11/16/16 Athens, Greece Remarks by President Obama at Stavros Niarchos 
Foundation Cultural Center in Athens, Greece 
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the People of 
Israel 
0 0 6 .2 11 .37 13 .43 30 





1 .07 3 .2 7 .47 4 .27 15 








0 0 0 0 10 .59 7 .41 17 
6/19/13 Obama Remarks by 
President 





0 0 1 .05 8 .38 12 .57 21 


































































































































6/30/13 Obama Remarks by 
President 
Obama at the 
University of 
Cape Town 
1 .04 0 0 12 .52 10 .43 23 
3/26/14 Obama Remarks by 
the President 
in Address to 
European 
Youth 
0 0 1 .05 3 .17 14 .78 18 






0 0 0 0 2 .40 3 .60 5 
4/27/14 Obama Remarks by 
President 







0 0 0 0 2 .50 2 .50 4 
9/3/14 Obama Remarks by 
President 
Obama to 
the People of 
Estonia 
0 0 0 0 6 .43 8 .57 14 





































































































































11/15/14 Obama Remarks by 
President 
Obama at the 
University of 
Queensland 
0 0 1 .03 16 .47 17 .50 34 




the People of 
India 
0 0 2 .08 6 .25 16 .67 24 







0 0 0 0 7 .70 3 .30 10 
4/10/15 Obama Remarks by 
President 
Obama at the 
Civil Society 
Forum 
0 0 0 0 10 .71 4 .29 14 





0 0 4 .14 14 .50 10 .36 28 
7/28/15 Obama Remarks by 
President 
Obama to 
the People of 
Africa 
2 .06 1 .03 17 .51 13 .39 33 






































































































































of the San 
Bernardino 
Shooting 
0 0 0 0 1 .50 1 .5 2 




the People of 
Europe 
1 .04 2 .07 13 .48 11 .41 27 




the People of 
Vietnam 
0 0 0 0 12 .48 13 .52 25 




the Attack in 
Orlando, 
Florida 
1 .25 1 .25 0 0 2 .50 4 
8/3/16 Obama Remarks by 
the President 





0 0 0 0 2 .33 4 .67 6 
9/6/16 Obama Remarks of 
President 
Obama to 
the People of 
Laos 










































































































































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
61 
APPENDIX C. LIST OF U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE TWEETS 




































































































































3/21/14 #alShabaab resorts 2 
recruiting a grandfather as 
suicide bomber, clear 
indication of desperation 
1 .5 1 .5 0 0 0 0 2 
4/25/14 @Dawla_NewsMedia this 
saying exposes #ISIS lies 
for the vast majority of 
those tortured and killed by 
#ISIS are Muslims 
1 .5 1 .5 0 0 0 0 2 
6/7/14 @Islamic_States this poor 
fellow should seek the 
German rapper 
@AbuMamadou to realize 
that becoming a terrorist has 
dire consequences 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
9/21/14 #ISIS claims to speak for 
Muslims, but it is a lie. 
They are their killers 
1 .5 1 .5 0 0 0 0 2 
9/22/14 Approx 30 Al Shabaab 
members surrendering per 
day, taking advantage of 
Somali amnesty program 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
10/8/14 Canadian Muslims: #ISIS 
fighters are repugnant to 
followers of Islam 
1 .5 0 0 0 0 1 .5 2 
10/10/14 Reports: #ISIS executes 
female former Iraqi MP 
Iman al-Salman - kidnapped 
a month ago, killed, body 
thrown in well 





































































































































10/13/14 Taliban victim survives, 
thrives, becomes youngest 
person to ever win Nobel 
Peace Prize 
0 0 1 .5 1 .5 0 0 2 
10/14/14 Syria: Small guerilla groups 
angry at crimes against 
Syrian people, hunting own 
& killing #ISIS 
1 .5 1 .5 0 0 0 0 2 
10/15/15 #ISIS sympathizer attempts 
to justify #ISIS enslaving, 
violating non-Muslim 
females [image of re-tweet 
“Taking female kafirs as 
salves is ibadah (an act of 
worship)…”] 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
10/20/14 Kobane: #ISIS lost many 
men, heavy equipment, but 
civilians still trapped under 
#ISIS attack 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
10/21/14 Jordanian Queen: Worst 
#ISIS crime has been 
associating Islam with 
extremism 
1 .5 1 .5 0 0 0 0 2 
12/21/14 Reports: Coalition airstrikes 
kill 3 high-level #ISIS 
leaders, including deputy to 
Baghdadi [image of ISIS 
organizational chart] 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
12/26/14 Iraq: #ISIS cut Internet 
service to Mosul, Anbar, & 
Ninewa to keep news, pics 
of their victims from view 
1 .5 1 .5 0 0 0 0 2 
12/30/14 Somalia: major Al Shabaab 
leader now in government 
hands - $3M reward offered 
for his capture 





































































































































2/22/15 Brother of Kayla Mueller, 
aid worked killed as #ISIS 
hostage: “May God keep 
you from any more harm, 
any more hurt.”  
1 .5 0 0 0 0 1 .5 2 
4/11/15 ISIS executes 300 prisoners 
in Qaim, Iraq, tribal chief 
says 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
5/3/15 “Take me home, Dad—
please take me home. Get 
me out of here.” British 
women who moved to Syria 
1 .5 1 .5 0 0 0 0 2 
5/29/15 “Desperate” #ISIS fighters 
set Beiji oil refinery ablaze 
as Iraqi security forces 
advance 
1 .5 1 .5 0 0 0 0 2 
6/5/15 Boko Haram: “a mindless, 
godless group as far away 
from Islam as you can think 
of,” said #Nigeria President 
@Mbuhari 
1 .5 1 .5 0 0 0 0 2 
7/13/15 Parallel can be drawn 
between #ISIS treatment of 
looted works of art and 
what the Nazis did: Lawyer 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
8/29/15 @UNESCO chief: #ISIS 
seeks to “deprive the Syrian 
people of its knowledge, 
identity, and history.” 
#HeritageInPeril 
1 .5 1 .5 0 0 0 0 2 
10/21/15 War crime researchers 
probing #ISIS over Yazidi 
massacre 





































































































































10/23/15 UN reports death or injury 
of 774 Taiz women between 
March & October 2015 at 
hands of Houthi and Saleh 
militias 
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
10/25/15 “Scholars (must) protect our 
youth and keep them from 
being entrapped by message 
of extremists,” Dr. Al Arabi 
1 .5 0 0 0 0 1 .5 2 
10/30/15 #ISIS arrested and executed 
21 militants of Caucasian 
nationalities near Aleppo 
for desertion 
1 .5 1 .5 0 0 0 0 2 
11/3/15 “At least 12 children have 
been reportedly killed by 
Islamic State radicals.” 
Saeed Mamuzini, media 
officer for KDP 
1 .5 1 .5 0 0 0 0 2 
11/6/15 Raqqa man: #ISIS fighters 
ask me to get them out; last 
year I helped four Jordanian 
fighters escape Daesh 
1 .5 1 .5 0 0 0 0 2 
11/7/15 Somali journalist killed by 
#AlShabaab was driven to 
show positive side of 
Somalia 
1 .5 1 .5 0 0 0 0 2 
11/9/15 #LetGirlsLearn program 
coming to Pakistan 
#FLOTUS 
0 0 0 0 1 .5 1 .5 2 
11/10/15 Egyptian police killed a top 
#ISIS operative in the 
capital implicated in a string 
of attacks 





































































































































11/12/15 U.S. Ambassador at 
Nigerian govt spokesperson 
training: coordinate your 
efforts to counter 
#BokoHaram propaganda 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
11/15/15 National Hockey League 
paid tribute to #Parisattacks 
victims with colors of 
French flag  
0 0 0 0 1 .5 1 .5 2 
11/16/15 Nigerian army repels 
#BokoHaram attack in 
#Borno town; 7 terrorists 
killed, weapons captured 
1 .5 1 .5 0 0 0 0 2 
12/3/15 #ISISagainstWomen [image 
of woman crying with 
words “tied the women to 
the back of a pickup truck 
and dragged them through 
the streets until they were 
covered in…”] 
1 .5 1 .5 0 0 0 0 2 
12/4/15 Officials say more than 60 
prisoners, mostly Afghan 
security personnel, were 
freed in joint U.S.-Afghan 
operation 
0 0 1 .5 0 0 1 .5 2 
12/10/15 “The overwhelming 
majority of American 
Muslims and Muslims 
worldwide, are men, women 
and children of peace.” 
@DHSgov Sec Jeh Johnson 
1 .5 0 0 1 .5 0 0 2 
12/13/15 Pentagon: #ISIS’s Abu 
Saleh dead; was the director 
of terror group’s finances & 
coordinator of profits 





































































































































12/15/15 Pakistan: 837 terrorist 
hideouts destroyed, main 
installations dismantled in 
military operation 
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
12/20/15 #ISIS terrorists kill Iraqi 
teacher for refusing to 
disseminate #Daesh 
propaganda 
1 .5 1 .5 0 0 0 0 2 
12/21/15 #Daesh “has made Yazidi 
women into flesh to be 
trafficked in,” 21-year-old 
Yazidi woman tells UN 
Security Council 
1 .5 1 .5 0 0 0 0 2 
12/25/15 #NoToDaesh [image of 
imam with words: “The 
recruiters wouldn’t leave 
him alone. They were on 
social media with him at all 
hours, they tweet him at 
night, irst thing in the 
morning.” US Imam on 
trying to help boy being 
wooed by ISIS recruiters”]  
1 .5 1 .5 0 0 0 0 2 
12/26/15 #NoToDaesh 
#DefeatingDaesh [image of 
footprint in mud with words 
“#WHYTHEYLEFTDAES
H”] 




$$$ Destroyed, hundreds of 
Daesh oil refineries, wells, 
fields and trucks to limit 
profits from oil sales, listed 
sanctions against 
individuals & businesses 
trading with Daesh, 
stopping oil refinery 






































































































































held territories, improving 
border security around Iraq 
and Syria to curtail oil 
smuggling, preventing sales 
of antiquities] 
1/4/16 Researcher: #ISIS ramping 
up propaganda efforts to 
mask its recent major 
losses. #DaeshLiesExposed 
1 .5 1 .5 0 0 0 0 2 
1/12/16 [Image of President Obama 
speaking with woman in 
headscarf at table with 
words: “Nations are 
stronger when people of all 
faiths feel that they are 
welcome, that they too, are 
full and equal members of 
our countries.” 
#ReligiousFreedom] 
0 0 0 0 1 .5 1 .5 2 
2/8/16 #DaeshDefectors 
#WhyTheyLeftDAESH 
[Image of man’s face 
wrapped in scarf with 
words: “Saleh worked as a 
translator for DAESH. His 
job was to convince 
hostages that they were safe 
up to the moment of their 
execution. After witnessing 
such cruelty, he fled from 
DAESH afraid for his own 
life.”] 
1 .5 1 .5 0 0 0 0 2 
2/12/16 “Joining #ISIS will not 
make you successful… it’s 
just going to make you an 
outcast.” #OpenYourEyes 





































































































































2/17/16 U.S. providing more than 
$195M in humanitarian aid 
for #BokoHaram affected 
populations, including IDPs 
& refugees 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 
3/4/16 Philippines military kills 24 
#ISIS supporters during raid 
on extremist stronghold, 
says spokesman. 
#DefeatingDeash 
[misspelling in tweet] 
1 .5 1 .5 0 0 0 0 2 
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APPENDIX D. PERFORMATIVE POWER OF U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Priority of the 








1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 
Threat definition 
and presentation 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
Link to existing 
discourses of 
threats & enemy 
images 









1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 










1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
Staging major 
terrorism trials 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 





1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Large mental 






1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
Unique level of 
interest & 
attention of CT 
issues  
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 
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